*Euthyphro*

* At 3bc, Euthyphro comments that he too is ridiculed by people when he speaks on religious matters, even though everything he has predicted has come to pass
  + So, Euthyphro takes it as evidence of his expertise that he is reliable
* At 3cd: Soc. maintains that Athenians don’t mind if someone is wise, so long as he doesn’t try to teach his wisdom
  + Wonder why that is
* 4a: Soc’s initial reaction to E’s claim that he is thought crazy (*mainomai*) to prosecute who he is prosecuting is that the person might easily fly away (*petomai*)
* at 4b: Soc maintains that most people could not know that prosecuting their father was the right (*echei orthOs*); only someone far advanced in wisdom (*Sophia*)
  + when Euthyphro agrees (4b) he maintains that he is wise (at least on these matters)
* 4c: unjust killing “pollutes” (*miasma*)(who, everyone?) and that pollution must be expelled or purified by bringing the killer to justice
* 4e: E’s relatives say that “a son’s prosecuting his father for murder” is impious (*anosion*)
* 4e3-5: Soc maintains that it must be E’s knowledge of the divine, specifically of piety and impiety, that leads him to be confident (not fear) that he is acting impiously in prosecuting his father for murder
* 5d: “what godliness and ungodliness” are; or do you not think that the pious and the impious are the same in all actions
  + cite this and talk at length; against parmenidean background
* **first definition**: 5d6:
  + pious: prosecute the wrongdoer (*epexienai tO(i) adikounti*)
  + impious: not to prosecute
    - appeals to mythology for support; the story that Zeus punished his own father (*chronus*)for an unjust killing; and Chronus had, in turn, castrated and kill his father (*Uranus*)
    - so, E claims that mythology shows that the fact that a wrongdoer is one’s father should not make a difference in whether or not you prosecute them for that wrongdoing
    - using the God’s as a standard for right action
* Soc rejects (6de): Soc didn’t ask for just one or two examples of pious (impious) action, but that one form (*eidos*, *idea*) in virtue of which all im/pious actions are im/pious, so that he can use that form as a model (*paradeigma*) to say of any action whether it is pious or impious
* **Second def** (7a): what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious
* Soc rejects (7a-8b): but there is enmity and disagreement among the gods; so that, one and the same thing can be dear to some gods but not dear to others (and this is most prominent on important issues of justice/injustice, beautiful/ugly, good/bad
  + So, on this definition, one and the same thing would turn out to be both pious and impious
  + But, that is impossible (or, at least, this is not what Soc was asking for)
* 9a: Soc restates the request for a “*tekmErion*” (sure sign, Grube—“proof”) (later 9b, *endeixis*)that all the gods consider the man E’s father killed to have been killed unjustly AND that it is right for the son of the killer (i.e. E, in this case) to prosecute the killer
* **3rd definition** (9d, Soc suggests and 9e E accepts): the pious is what *all* the gods love, the impious is what *all* the gods hate
* 10a: Soc’s big question: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”
  + something being X-ed and something X-ing
    - being carried, carrying
    - being led, leading
    - being seen, seeing
    - therefore, also: being loved, loving
  + is the thing being X-ed, being X-ed because something is X-ing it, or for some other reason
    - for example: if we ask, what makes it true that this piece of chalk is being carried? The answer is, because professor schwab is carrying it
    - if we ask, what makes it true that this chalkboard is being seen? The answer is, because we are all seeing it
    - the thing that does the X-ing is prior to and explains why the thing being X-ed is being X-ed
  + **Read through 10bc with them**: pose it as, what is the correct way to answer various questions?
  + Then at 10c5 he applies this to the case of love: being loved is being affected
    - So, the same principle applies
    - If we ask: why is X (prosecuting E’s father) loved by the gods, we don’t answer “because it is being loved by them” but “because the gods love it”
    - So, if our definition of “pious” is “loved by all the gods”
    - It is loved *because* it is pious: if we ask “why do the gods love it” the answer is “because it is pious”
    - But, we wanted it to be the other way around: we wanted to answer the question “why is it pious” with “because it is loved by the gods”
  + 10e: final rejection
    - being loved by all the gods is, at best, an “affect” or “quality” of the pious; it is not the nature of the pious; it is not the correct answer to the question “what is it for something to be pious”
* 11eff: Soc gets E to agree that all that is pious is just, then asks whether justice and piety are co-extensive
  + e.g.: where there is fear there is also shame (poet--Stasinus)
  + Soc disagrees: many people fear things (e.g. disease and poverty) but are not ashamed (at feeling fear of those things)
  + But, whenever people feel shame they also feel fear (e.g. of a bad reputation)
  + Also: wherever there is oddness there is number, but not vice-versa
* 12d: the pious is part of justice, but what part?
  + The example is evenness: evenness is the part of number that is divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts
* **4th definition** 12e5: the pious is the part of justice concerned with the care of the gods (the care of men is the remaining part of justice)
* **Soc rejects**: but what does E mean by care
  + Standardly, “care” is only pertinent when the object cared for is made better by the caring
  + so, by E’s 4th definition, the gods would be made better when someone does something pious
  + but, E finds that wrong; the gods are not made better by pious actions
  + ok, so maybe not made better, but there is some achievement that the care aims at
    - shipbuilders aim at building ships, generals at winning in war, etc.
  + E doesn’t answer (possibly because there is no answer), but just sort of says “the man who knows how to propitiate the gods does the pious act), leads to
* **5th definition** 14c: knowledge (*epistEmE*) of how to sacrifice and pray
  + sacrifice is to make a gift
  + pray is to beg for something from them
  + but to give (i.e. sacrifice) correctly, would be to give them what they need
  + so, piety here would be knowledge of what should be asked for from and given to, the gods
    - so, piety is a sort of trading skill (*emporikos*)
  + when Soc asks what benefit the gods received from us in this trade, E falls back again to saying that there is no benefit
  + the gifts we give them are honor, reverence, and gratitude
    - these things are pleasing, not beneficial
  + so, we are back again to saying that the pious is what is dear to the gods
* Gotta start again, but E demurs and leaves